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Illustrations

Introduction
The breakdown of the Soviet Union was the consequence of international contradictions and failures of the Soviet system. 1 In 1990, Gorbachev declared an end to the Cold War and signaled to countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary that the Soviet Union would not stand in the way of political change. 2 Some time later, President Clinton's administration presented a number of basic motivations for NATO expansion, consistently emphasizing the importance of consolidating democratic and market gains in Eastern and Central Europe, and building an expanded Western democratic community. 3 As a new democracy, Poland saw NATO as a way to establish an unbreakable tie to Europe and the West. 4 Joining NATO could guarantee the security of the nation that had often been sacrificed to great power politics in the past, and it might extend Europe's zone of peace and prosperity from the west to the east.
The political leaders of Poland viewed NATO as an institution of shared interests (protection against a common threat) and as an institution of shared values (promotion of democracy and peaceful relations between the members). The related sense of security and the prospect of membership in NATO encouraged the government of Poland to pursue domestic reforms in advance of truly joining the alliance. To gain NATO membership, a candidate country is obliged to engage in required institutional reforms.
In Poland, certain steps were specified by NATO as a necessary introduction to the alliance: democratic institutions, progress toward a market economy, armed forces in civilian hands, settled territorial borders, and movement toward interoperability with NATO forces. NATO's assistance helped Poland a great deal. At the beginning of the transition process in Poland, the new democratic government was so fragile that the excommunists were likely to gain power again. The NATO countries helped Poland succeed in carrying out reforms, which had a huge effect on the domestic situation as well as on the rest of the region.
Additionally, the decision taken by NATO to include Poland in its defense structure had a number of military advantages. Poland is one of the three new NATO members with the Czech Republic, and Hungary, that have been making a serious effort to meet NATO standards. 5 There is no question that Poland's military is as outdated as that of the other two countries. The difference, however, is that despite its financial problems, Poland has made a serious effort to upgrade its force structure and doctrine. In 1990 and 1992, the Polish government published "doctrinal" texts setting out the security and defense policy of Poland, their view of potential threats, and the new purposes and tasks of the armed forces. 6 Furthermore, in 1998, Warsaw adopted the "Program for
Integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Modernization of the Polish
Armed Forces 1998-2012." 7 This plan provided a strategy for integrating Poland into NATO.
While Poland has begun to carry out the plan's goals, it still needs to continue its reorganization to achieve NATO obligations. In spite of equipment improvements, Poland must create a command and control system reflecting NATO expectations and standards. Implementation of the system will also help in training command post personnel and pilots according to NATO standards and procedures. The training could be accomplished over Polish territory, a cheaper option than having to obtain NATO- • To guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country, and infrangibility of its borders;
• To guarantee security of the democratic constitutional order, in particular, all human rights and liberties, and the safety of the citizen of Republic of Poland;
• To establish the best possible conditions for comprehensive and stable social and economic development of the country, the prosperity of its citizens, for maintenance of the national heritage, and the development of the national identity;
• To contribute to the development of a stable, fair, and peaceful order in Europe and throughout the world, based on the principles of democracy, human rights, law, and solidarity.
The Principles of Polish Security Policy:
• Poland treats security in a complex way, allowing for the importance and influence of a variety of political, military, economic, social, and environmental and energy factors;
• Poland implements its security policy according to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, with respect to international law, according to the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OBWE), and according to the spirit and letter of international treaties and conventions to which it is a party.
Treating its borders as inviolable, Poland has no territorial claim beyond its current borders and has relations regulated by treaties with all its neighbors.
Poland does not intend to strengthen its own security at the expense of security of others;
• In its activities in the arena of international politics, Poland follows the values, ideas, and principles included in the North Atlantic Treaty and European
Treaties, in order to realize the vision of a free and democratic Europe where security, prosperity, and favorable conditions for cultural development and the maintenance of national identity constitute the common and indivisible good for uniting the continent;
• Poland strictly connects its security with the security of NATO countries and members of the European Community. Poland fulfils its own security interests mostly within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance system of cooperation and solidarity, by supporting international efforts aimed to strengthen security in Europe and throughout the world, and to protect basic human rights;
• Poland supports the idea that the use of force in the international arena should be limited exclusively to exercising the right of self-defense, as provided in the in November 1992. 6 These two documents provided the first revision effort of the postCold War era and a new point of view on the security considerations of the new political order.
"Armed Forces 2012"
The Polish Armed Forces started their preparation for NATO membership in 1990.
An important event was their participation in NATO's "Partnership for Peace" (PfP)
program, launched in 1994. 7 The PfP program is designed to prepare future member countries' armed forces to join NATO. During combined exercise training, operating procedures for peace support and crisis management operations were planned and executed in combined training exercises. 8 Armed Forces 2012 says that the defense budget will increase at the same rate as the state budget and in the first five years the part devoted for purchasing military equipment should reach a rate 3% higher than the state budget. 10 This initiative also established the need for developing a multi-role fighter (MRF). However, it will be very difficult to find $3 billion for the MRF program, when the Polish economy has just slowed down. • MOD budget not less than 1.95% GDP;
• Reducing the Armed Forces from 206,000 to 150,000 by the end of 2003;
• Financing the most important projects of modernization and research only;
• Withdrawing from service ineffective and obsolete military equipment;
• Liquidating useless garrisons;
• Reorganizing the structure of the Armed Forces. • PAADF Headquarters;
• Combined Air Operation Center;
• Two Air Defense Corps with ten squadrons of tactical aviation, 25 SAM units and radiotechnical and support units.
• To create four Osrodkow Dowodzenia I Naprowadzania (ODN) and after they achieve operational readiness, the Corps level of command and control will be abolished. 13 Thus, according to these programs, we have long and short-term approaches where we could adapt our Command and Control System to NATO requirements and obligations. The second step, which should be taken simultaneously, is a new MRF program of purchase for the PAADF. Some scholars think that these two initiatives might be the last chance for the Polish Armed Forces. Poland has met many of NATO's interoperability objectives, including command and management, the operation and tactics of individual services, logistics, air navigation and control procedures, and airfield infrastructure and engineering support to meet NATO requirements. 2 The Polish Armed Forces (PAF) are the instrument of defense and define security policy according to the Constitution. The PAF serves to protect both the independence and the indivisibility of the territory of Poland. Its task results from the National Security Strategy and is specified in both national and allied plans of crisis reaction and defense. According to the MOD, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland acting both within the national defense systems and within the NATO Alliance are prepared to perform three strategic tasks:
• Defensive -to repulse direct aggression against Poland or against another allied country;
• Crisis reaction -to include participation in international organizations' missions;
• Stabilization and preventive -during peacetime. 3 Based on these broad responsibilities, and according to Maj. Gen. Lech Konopka, the former Chief of Staff of the PAADF, the Polish Air and Air Defense Forces will be required to conduct a broad spectrum of tasks. In peacetime the PAADF:
• Conducts "Air Policing," reconnaissance and surveillance over Poland's territory to prevent airspace violations;
• Supports and controls the National Search and Rescue System;
• Takes part in monitoring neighboring countries' armed forces to obtain necessary warning time of possible hostile actions;
• Controls training of subordinate assets during current operations and exercises;
• Assigns selected forces to NATO peace support operations outside Poland's territory.
During crisis:
• Increases level of operational readiness and conducts defensive readiness activities in accordance with political leadership decisions;
• Prepares to support NATO reinforcement forces within the framework of preplanned crisis management actions;
• Conducts CAOC typical function;
• Conducts reconnaissance and airspace surveillance over Poland's territory;
• Shifts to the appropriate readiness level;
• Controls operations directed by political and military authorities, e.g. a show of force;
During conflict or wartime:
• Commands and controls attached air assets;
• Counters air operations;
• Interdicts the battle area;
• Provides offensive air support for the ground troops;
• Provides tactical air support for maritime forces operations;
• Plans combat actions required for self-defense against potential adversaries.
4
The Post-Cold Era Legacy
Since the Warsaw Pact was dissolved on April 1, 1991, the PAF, including the air forces, has tried to find an answer for the question of how to adapt to the new role of a fully independent state. The initial concern was to identify what was left from the past and how to transform these forces for new alliance requirements. In the Warsaw Pact, air, air defense, land, and navy forces were independent services. These included two "One of the most important challenges facing the Polish Air and Air Defense will be the modernization of equipment, such as IFF and communications and navigation systems, to conform to NATO requirements."
5
The NATO Alliance
The Polish Air and Air Defense Forces are assigned to protect the air space of the Republic of Poland. The C2 system is integrated with the NATO air defense system and maintains continuous readiness to combat any acts of violation of the air system, to stop possible air aggression and weaken its resources. During a crisis or war, the Polish Air and Air Defense Forces also support the Land Forces and the Navy. 6 However the integration with NATO has not been finished and requires additional steps to achieve full NATO requirements.
In terms of equipment, priority was to be given to obtain a computerized electronic communication system of command and recognition and the most advanced radar system.
Poland is within the AOR of the Allied Forces North Europe Command and the
Commander Allied Air Forces North (COMAIRNORTH). COMAIRNORTH will exercise OPCON as regional air commander through combined air operation centers (CAOCs). 12 Moreover, the ODNs will possess tactical control of units. Therefore, the Corps level of command and control, i.e. ADC, would be abolished. 13 The ODN control centers will not conduct planning and organization of air operations, but will be focused on providing control of air asset employment. According to these changes, the C2 System should look like that shown in Appendix B. The AOD will be issued at PAADF HQ, which will possess OPCON over attached assets, and the COP will distribute ATOs. Therefore, the COP will exercise TACON over air assets and will be able to command and control these assets to accomplish missions. However, the most important problem in meeting NATO requirements and obligations is the TAB position in the C2 System.
At the end of the 1990s, the TABs replaced the strike divisions, which had the tools to exercise command and control in their possession. Furthermore, the divisions had only strike assets while air defense fighters were attached to Air Defense Corps. While the Moreover, the ATO is issued directly to the units. The role of the TAB in the decision making process is virtually nil. All decisions for using air assets are made at COP level.
Below that is only task execution.
The TAB role is important during peacetime, something akin to the American concept of ADCON, but it is not useful during crisis and/or wartime. Moreover, the reason is very simple. The TAB has TACON over squadrons placed in many places in northern or southern Poland, depending on the Air Defense Corps attachment. Lack of any command and control tools causes the system to be ineffective and insufficient in the NATO environment. However, we can model the Germans' system where the organizational administration, training, and logistics support is conducted by divisional organizational structures. However, operational control during crisis and/or wartime is based on NATO's CAOCs deployed in Germany. Poland can follow this model where the TAB staffs should reinforce the C2 System Posts and would not exist in the C2 System during crisis and wartime. Therefore, the ATO should be issued directly from COP-CAOC to SOC, and ODN-CRC (Appendix E).
In my opinion, this solution would let us meet NATO expectations and obligations and achieve complete compatibility and interoperability. In this structure, the COP will be the essential execution element for PAADF HQ to command and control air assets both during offensive and defensive counter air operations. Simultaneously, the COP could delegate TACON to subordinate posts like the ODN. In this situation, the task would go from AIRNORTH, working with the PAADF, and through the COP, to the ODN, which would execute TACON during combat activities and mission execution.
During peacetime, the ODN would be responsible for conducting air surveillance over Polish territory and the "air policing" mission, using Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) fighters subordinate to NATO's CAOC 2 in Kalkar (Germany) with COP support.
Furthermore, we need to familiarize command and control post personnel with NATO operational and tactical procedures and fundamental rules for command.
To summarize, the future Polish Command and Control System must be an integral part of the NATO Command and Control System. The system and procedures must be the same among all alliance members. For that reason, the Polish C2 System must reorganize to meet NATO requirements, expectations, and obligations. accomplish the appropriate number of flying hours because it is the key to matching the experience levels of our Allies.
However, "the dilemma facing the government is whether to update older equipment or go for one of the various offers from Western manufacturers that are on the table." 4 If
Poland does not buy a new MRF and does not modernize its MiG-29s and Su-22s within 5-6 years, it will not have any serviceable combat planes. 5 This means Poland must expedite the process of contracting with the Western countries to buy a new MRF.
The question is whether an aircraft upgrade lets the PAADF attain the compatibility and interoperability required to fulfil NATO expectations. According to Maj. Gen. Lech
Konopka, the former Chief of Staff of the PAADF, "When carefully compared, the Western multi-role combat aircraft represented better characteristics in performing all the separate tasks individually than the specialized in the particular task Eastern-made aircraft." 8 There is little question that it is high time to change the equipment, which is far away from NATO standards and requirements.
New Alliance
Because of the geographic and strategic location of Poland, and the nature of its defense assignments, the PAADF's priority is on upgrading and developing the armed forces as a whole. Operations, but, again, the lack of AAR capabilities could limit the aircraft flying time behind the FLOT.
The East Germans did successfully use the aircraft after rejoining West Germany.
The German MiGs have two additional external tanks that extend their flying time to almost three hours. However, it decreases their combat capabilities because the aircraft are not able to carry semi-active air to air missiles (AAM). Moreover, only 8 aircraft are upgraded to this version and the rest of the aircraft require a major overhaul, which will cost Poland money.
Another necessity is to convert a squadron for these new MiGs. The only squadron equipped with Fulcrums and pilots who are able to do the conversion is in Minsk Mazowiecki, the 1st Tactical Air Squadron. Based on current projections, they will need about 2 years (optimistic vision) to do the conversion. Moreover, the 1st TAS already has other taskings. Most of the instructors are included in the top 12 pilots of the NATO group. Current tasks and training will be affected by attempting to convert the squadron to the MiG-29s.
Another argument against the Fulcrums is that Poland wants to take over the MiGs in
2002, but the German government wants to postpone the deal until June 2003. 18 The
Germans want to postpone the deal until they replace the MiG-29 squadron with a Eurofighter squadron. With this delay, the converted squadron will be able to attain operational readiness only around 2004, or even as late as 2005. As a result, the MiG-29s
will be operational only until 2010, giving Poland only 5 to 6 years of service in the PAADF. Simultaneously, the German MiG-29s need major overhaul that will cost more money. In addition to that, we still have some problems with our Russian suppliers over spare parts.
Spare part delays for several months cost Poland delays in their training programs.
Janusz Zemke, Vice Minister of Defense, said the program of buying a new aircraft would proceed simultaneously with the Fulcrum purchase and first aircraft delivery should be expected by 2005. 19 Because of that, the question has emerged in the press whether Poland really needs the German MiG-29s when it is going to buy the MRF?
According to Maj. Gen. Lech Konopka, the aircraft, must fulfil a broad spectrum of tasks:
• Fighting for air superiority, both offensive and defensive counter air;
• Air interdiction;
• Close air support;
• Tactical air support for maritime operations;
• Air reconnaissance. 20 Based on these tasking, the MiG-29 is not able to cover this broad spectrum of missions because it is a highly specialized fighter, not a MRF.
The next problem is a financial one. It is an optimistic budget, but Poland has so far not considered buying the additional MiG-29s
and will have to find money to pay for that while simultaneously continuing to buy a new MRF. The typical combat aircraft today costs $20-30 million per piece. 22 As the PAADF needs 60 new MRF, the total cost would be between $2.5-3.5 billion. 23 However, Poland currently has a few economic problems. A new government created after the 2001 election has to face these problems. The Polish budget has a deficit of 40 billion zlotych 24 and the new government is trying to fill the gap. 25 Thus, the Polish government might have problems allocating $3 billion for the MRF when the whole of Polish society is looking carefully at what the government is doing. 26 Because of this fact, buying a new aircraft is getting to be very problematic for economic reasons.
Poland is also interested in buying the future joint strike fighter (JSF), at least according to the politicians' declarations. 27 In the latest news (interview with the Commander in Chief of PAADF, Lt. Gen. Andrzej Duleba), the F-16 successor would be the JSF. 28 Thus, if Poland is really interested in that option, it makes more sense to buy a new MRF, like the F-16 and not to look for the other option of the German MiG-29s.
Involvement in the German MiG-29s option is therefore a waste of time and a waste of the most important thing--money. Poland cannot afford to buy the MiGs and the new MRF simultaneously. Additionally, if Poland buys the Fulcrums, the decision for a new MRF matter will probably be postponed. Poland must look at its primary requirement, which is fulfilling the alliance pact instead of looking for cheap, but short-term, solutions. Poland needs a multi-role aircraft in the near-term, so the only viable solution is to buy F-16s C/D. Immediate delivery of aircraft is not everything. Time is needed to prepare the operators of the platform like pilots and maintenance personnel. Based on the aircraft's limitations and resupply problems, the Germans' MiG-29s can not fulfil Poland's expectations and is a short-term solution at best. Moreover, spare parts for our existing aircraft are an increasing problem because of lack of reliability of Eastern suppliers.
Finally, additional delays and renegotiations with NATO will probably discredit the Polish Government in our Allies' eyes. As this paper has argued, Poland must take immediate action to fulfil its requirements for NATO membership. The Polish C2 System must be an integral part of the NATO C2 System. Thus, Poland should create the COP that will exercise TACON over air assets and will be able to exercise command and control over attached assets to accomplish the mission. The COP will issue ATOs and virtually make all decisions for employ air assets. Hence, the TAB's role would be important during peacetime, something akin to the American concept of ADCON. Therefore, the TAB staffs should reinforce the C2 System Posts and would not exist in the C2 System during crisis and/or wartime. Moreover, after the ODNs achieve operational readiness, the Corps level of command and control, i.e. ADC would be abolished. 1 Therefore, the ATO should be issued directly from COP-CAOC to SOC, and ODN-CRC (Appendix E). This solution would let Poland meet NATO expectations and obligations and achieve complete compatibility and interoperability. To summarize, the future Polish Command and Control System must be an integral part of the NATO Command and Control System.
The system and procedures must be the same among all alliance members. For that reason, the Polish C2 System must reorganize to meet NATO requirements, expectations, and obligations.
Poland also has to expedite modernization of its Air Forces, but it needs a long-term approach. This means Poland should think ahead and try to find the best solution. The 
